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Introduction 
 
Nordic-Baltic Security, Germany and NATO 
The Baltic Sea Region Is a Test Case for European Security 
Claudia Major and Alicia von Voss 
The countries around the Baltic Sea are among Europe’s frontline states affected by the 
conflict between Russia and western Europe. The Baltics and Nordics share a common 
concern about a revisionist, aggressive, and rearming Russia: Since the onset of the crisis 
in and around Ukraine in 2014, these countries have felt increasingly exposed to Rus-
sian military and non-military intimidation. Currently, they can neither defend nor 
maintain regional security by themselves: Their capacities are limited and their mem-
berships in different security institutions (EU and NATO) complicate a common assess-
ment and response, as do their diverging security policies. They depend on the deter-
rence and defence efforts of their partners and NATO. This has turned the regional Nor-
dic–Baltic security challenge into a European and transatlantic one. NATO’s credibility 
depends on whether it can guarantee the security of those countries. Germany, as one 
of the largest and most capable countries bordering the Baltic Sea, should contribute 
towards improving regional security by supporting regional cooperation, and by 
sharpening the Nordic–Baltic dimension of its security policy. 
 
The ongoing crisis in Ukraine has dramatic 
effects on regional security: Although Rus-
sian assertiveness is visible in all of Europe, 
it is particularly noticeable in the Baltic Sea 
region, which comprises the Nordic coun-
tries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, 
Sweden), Poland, and the Baltics (Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania). The region has developed 
from a rather inclusive security community 
into a defence community in a confronta-
tional environment. 
Between the end of the Cold War and 
the illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 
and the war in Ukraine, the cooperation of 
Nordic and Baltic countries with Russia had 
intensified and improved on regional issues 
such as search and rescue, border regula-
tions in areas such as Kaliningrad, and coast-
guard cooperation. There was institutional-
ised bilateral and multilateral cooperation, 
be it between Poland and Russia, Norway 
and Russia, or in the Council of the Baltic 
Sea States and the Arctic Council. The Al-
liance and Russia cooperated in the NATO–
Russia Council in areas such as defence doc-
trines and civil emergency. In reaction to 
the crisis in Ukraine, many of these links 
have been put on hold. Although NATO 
has suspended practical cooperation with 
Russia, political dialogue is officially still 
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possible but takes place on a very low level. 
Some bilateral ties continue to exist, such 
as agreements on border crossings between 
Russia and Norway. Overall, tensions with 
Russia have augmented tremendously, with 
the states in the region feeling fundamen-
tally threatened. 
From Cooperation to Confrontation 
The main pattern with regard to Russia is no 
longer cooperation but confrontation. The 
countries in the region are exposed to Rus-
sian military and non-military intimidation. 
There is a risk of both a conventional mili-
tary escalation and a hybrid one that com-
bines military and non-military instruments. 
In military terms, Russia has intensified 
its activities and increased its presence 
on the Russian side of the border, in inter-
national waters and airspace, and in the 
Russian exclave Kaliningrad, squeezed 
between Lithuania and Poland. At this sen-
sitive spot in the Baltic Sea, Russia has 
increased its anti-access/area denial capabil-
ities (A2/AD): It has deployed anti-ship weap-
ons, air defences, and electronic warfare 
equipment. It has made it more difficult for 
NATO to operate in the Baltic Sea if neces-
sary, e.g. to reinforce NATO forces in the 
Baltic states during a crisis. Particularly in 
2014 and 2015, Moscow again expanded its 
military capacities in its Western Military 
District, which borders the NATO allies Nor-
way, Poland, and the Baltic states. Exercises 
were intensified and weapon systems mod-
ernised. Russia also strengthened its ground 
forces and deployed modern anti-aircraft sys-
tems. It is demonstrating its military might 
by increasing the number of Russian air-
craft flying close to NATO airspace, and by 
nuclear messaging. For example, Moscow 
temporarily deployed nuclear-capable Iskan-
der missiles to Kaliningrad during exercises. 
Further forms of escalation are unan-
nounced Russian exercises in which NATO 
members – but also non-allied states such 
as Sweden – are designated as the enemy. 
Yet, a potential escalation could also 
start in non-military realms, such as through 
cyber attacks, steering minority uprisings, 
or – probably in combination with propa-
ganda – economic coercion. The countries 
of the region have been – and continue 
to be – exposed to a Russian policy of pin-
pricks and provocations in various areas. 
This includes sabre-rattling public state-
ments, such as Moscow threatening Den-
mark that its nuclear weapons can target 
Danish ships participating in NATO’s mis-
sile defence system (2015). Other examples 
are incidents such as the abduction of an 
Estonian spy by Russia (2014), Russian 
bombers targeting Swedish military assets 
(2015), and Russia letting migrants pass 
the border via the northern route (2015/16). 
There is also an increasing level of propa-
ganda being used for the purposes of con-
fusion, misinformation, or manipulation, 
with Russian-speaking minorities in the 
Baltic countries being the main targets. 
Moscow is also threatening to use infra-
structural links for blackmail, such as the 
energy supply routes that still link the 
Baltic countries to Russia. 
Overall, Moscow is using various oppor-
tunities to test the reactions, preparedness, 
political unity, and military readiness of 
the Europeans. These actions form what 
is often coined hybrid warfare. It describes 
the combined use of military and civilian 
means – such as propaganda or economic 
blackmail – in a conflict, with the overall 
goal to destabilise the target country. It is 
not a new phenomenon, yet the scope and 
intensity of these actions – and the impor-
tance of technological means – have caught 
western Europe by surprise. Such an ap-
proach expands the grey area between 
peace and conflict: force still plays a role, 
but is often not directly attributable to any 
party, nor does it have a clear military char-
acter. This undermines the internationally 
recognised prohibition on the use of force 
by making it difficult to define – and it 
makes it complicated for the international 
community to develop a coordinated re-
action. This is the aim when using hybrid 
strategies: Delay a united response and 
gain the momentum to create facts on the 
SWP Comments 13 
March 2016 
3 
ground. The overall result is a deeply trans-
formed regional security, with increasing 
levels of fragility and volatility. 
The Nordic–Baltic Security 
Conundrum 
For several reasons, the Nordic and Baltic 
countries are particularly vulnerable. To 
start with, the region is a patchwork with 
regard to membership in security institu-
tions. There are NATO members (Baltic coun-
tries, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Poland) 
and non-NATO members (Finland, Sweden); 
non-EU (Norway, Iceland) and EU countries 
(all others, but Denmark has opted out of 
the CSDP). This complicates cooperation 
and coordination. The geographic setting 
amplifies these membership issues. The 
security guarantees that NATO offers to its 
members depend on cooperation with non-
members: For geographic and logistic 
reasons, NATO can hardly defend the Bal-
tics if it is not allowed to use Swedish and 
Finnish (i.e. non-NATO) airspace and air-
fields. Although the two countries have 
declared their support to do so, NATO can-
not automatically use Swedish and Finnish 
facilities in times of crisis; the Alliance still 
needs their consent. 
Vice versa, if Sweden or Finland were 
attacked, the entire region’s security would 
be affected: NATO could hardly stand by 
idly, even if there is no Art. 5 obligation 
(which is for Allies only). Besides, the two 
countries could consider invoking the 
defence clause of the EU’s Lisbon Treaty 
(Art. 42.7), which obliges EU states to offer 
“aid and assistance by all means in their 
power” in case an EU member is the “victim 
of armed aggression on its territory”. France 
invoked the article after the November 
2015 Paris attacks. In case of a crisis, part-
icularly Finland and Sweden – as EU, but 
non-NATO, members – could contemplate 
activating European support via this clause. 
Yet, so far, it is not clear what the invoca-
tion of Art. 42.7 would mean in military 
terms. Still, the countries of the region have 
all come to recognise that, due to the geo-
graphic setting, membership obligations, 
and overlapping bilateral links, the region 
is one interdependent military operational 
area from which no country can withdraw. 
Also, the regional geography is unfavour-
able: The countries share long borders with 
Russia (Estonia, Lithuania, Finland, Nor-
way), which are often difficult to access and 
sparsely populated (like in Norway) or have 
exposed outposts (like the Swedish island 
of Gotland). Particularly the Baltics are mis-
sing strategic depth: In Estonia the shortest 
distance from the Russian border to the 
coast is only 176 km; the distance from 
Narva, near the Russian border, to the capi-
tal, Tallinn, located at the Baltic coast, is 
196 km. At the same time, the Baltics are 
in many ways more closely linked to Russia 
than to western Europe. This is a legacy 
from Soviet times, and applies to energy 
networks, Russian investment, Russian 
minorities, but also to the populations that 
speak Russian and are thus exposed to Rus-
sian media and propaganda. 
Besides, the defence spending of all coun-
tries in the region is low: Sweden reaches 
u4.9bn, Norway u4.7bn, Latvia u0.25bn (for 
comparison: Germany spends about u33bn, 
the United Kingdom u45bn). Although the 
Baltic states have almost doubled their de-
fence budgets since 2014, in view of reach-
ing the 2 per cent of GDP target required 
by NATO, it means little buying power: The 
Estonian defence budget of 2.1 per cent of 
GDP amounts to roughly u0.5bn. Also, their 
armed forces (active service men, without 
reserve) are small compared to most NATO 
allies: Denmark 17,200, Sweden 15,300, 
Latvia 5,310, Poland 99,000 (Germany has 
177,000 active service men, France 215,000). 
Yet, some countries are considering reintro-
ducing conscription (Sweden) or have re-
cently done so (Lithuania), whereas others 
have – or are developing – reserve systems 
to substantially increase the numbers in 
times of crisis. Finland counts only 22,200 
active service men, yet its reserve system 
is said to allow its armed forces to quickly 
reach 200,000 personnel. 
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Fragmented Defence Cooperation 
A further complicating factor is the frag-
mented defence cooperation. The countries 
of the region do not – or not fully – coordi-
nate their threat assessments, military 
plans, procurements, or exercises, despite 
the increased threat perception. This nega-
tively affects regional security, stability, 
and capacity to act. Although defence co-
operation between the Nordic countries is 
comparatively well developed – be it multi-
nationally, such as in the Northern Defence 
Cooperation (Nordefco), or bilaterally, such 
as between Finland and Sweden – there is 
no overarching Nordic–Baltic cooperation 
framework that includes all countries of 
the region. Nordefco recently associated the 
Baltic countries and Poland, yet this remains 
at a very low level. The bilateral relation-
ships are better developed, and they tend 
to bridge the gap between NATO and EU 
members. Non-aligned Sweden and NATO 
ally Denmark recently began to intensify 
their cooperation, such as the sharing of 
naval and air-base infrastructure and in-
creased training and exercises. Both under-
line that the decision was influenced by 
Russia’s policies, which have created a more 
unpredictable security landscape in the 
region. Also, Sweden and Finland recently 
signed a series of agreements to further 
deepen cooperation in areas such as train-
ing and the setting-up of joint units. Quite 
ironically, at the same time, Swedish–Nor-
wegian cooperation came to a standstill. 
The low level of overall regional coopera-
tion and the resulting fragmentation of 
cooperation is partly due to a low level of 
trust, which results from different threat 
assessments and strategic cultures. There 
is indeed hardly such a thing as a common 
Nordic–Baltic approach to security. Al-
though all countries agree that the threat 
situation has worsened, reactions differ. 
Some, such as Sweden, have revitalised the 
“total defence” concept, according to which 
civil defence and psychological defence are 
required alongside military tools; whereas 
others, such as Poland, favour military 
answers in a NATO context. While all are 
concerned about Russian assertiveness, dis-
agreement prevails on how to deal with 
Moscow. Whereas the Baltics and Poland 
are insisting on a clear deterrent message, 
are asking for additional support from 
NATO, and remain sceptical about dialogue 
with Moscow, countries such as Norway 
favour a double-track approach based on de-
terrence and dialogue, in view of improving 
regional security. Poland has a special role, 
in that it is the one to most clearly articu-
late its defence concerns, criticisms of Mos-
cow, and its requests to NATO and seeks to 
position itself as a regional leader. Generally, 
in light of the major differences in the 
strategic cultures, the five Nordic countries 
fear that a further integration of the Baltic 
states into their Nordic defence settings 
might dilute the comparatively high level 
of cooperation already reached, or hinder 
progress. 
Besides, NATO membership is still a 
topic of dispute. Over the last two years, 
Finland and Sweden have re-energised this 
debate and strengthened their ties with 
NATO. Both signed agreements with NATO 
at the 2014 Wales summit to strengthen 
cooperation, such as to provide Allied forces 
logistical support, including barracks, trans-
port, and munitions (Host Nation Support 
agreement – HNS). As Enhanced Opportunities 
Partners, they have a special status since 2014 
to discuss the further deepening of dia-
logue and practical cooperation with NATO. 
In both countries, the debate on member-
ship has intensified, with more public 
debates taking place, and the government 
or parliament ordering reports on the pros 
and cons and potential consequences (Swe-
den: 2015 Bertelman report, Bringeus Re-
port currently being elaborated). Although 
public opinion polls suggest growing levels 
of support for membership, there is no clear 
majority on the issue. Mainly for identity 
politics, both countries fear an entangle-
ment with NATO that would negatively af-
fect their security policies, and thus remain 
reluctant to join the Alliance. 
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A Regional Challenge Is Turning 
into a European One 
Thus, none of these arrangements provides 
an adequate response to the current threats. 
They are too fragmented and diverse. These 
countries’ strategic incoherence, their 
limited ability to defend themselves with-
out outside help, and the threat this poses 
to NATO’s and the EU’s credibility are turn-
ing the regional Nordic–Baltic security chal-
lenge into a European and transatlantic 
one. The region might not necessarily be a 
priority for Russia’s expansive or aggressive 
intentions, but it is the most convenient to 
test Europe’s capacity to act. 
NATO’s credibility depends on whether 
it can guarantee the security of those coun-
tries and, in particular, the three most 
vulnerable to Russian aggression: Estonia, 
Latvia, and Lithuania. If the Baltics are 
attacked or undermined (e.g. through co-
ercive but non-military action), the Euro-
pean security order based on the EU and 
NATO could enter a deep, even existential 
crisis – depending upon the answer that 
NATO and the EU would be able and willing 
to give. Overall, Europe’s political cohesion 
and solidarity are being challenged. The 
EU’s credibility is at stake when it comes to 
ensuring European political unity to jointly 
react to an attack on one of its members. 
Thus, in several dimensions, the Baltic Sea 
area can indicate how credible Europe’s 
defence policy is. 
Improving Regional Security 
To address this situation – and acknowledg-
ing that the Russian threat is not tempo-
rary and the region is one military strategic 
area – NATO has been developing a Baltic Sea 
focus (which it did not have before) since 
2014, and it decided on a fundamental mili-
tary adaptation of the Alliance at its 2014 
summit. The objective is a large-scale re-
inforcement and reorganisation of defence 
capabilities, with the main instrument being 
the Readiness Action Plan (RAP). Collective 
defence has been underlined as NATO’s 
core task. 
The RAP is based on two pillars: reassur-
ance and adaptation. With the assurance 
measures, the Alliance is signalling to its 
eastern members that they can rely on 
NATO’s promise of defence and deterrence. 
The measures include intensified maritime 
surveillance – especially in the Baltic Sea – 
and additional exercises, mainly in eastern 
Europe. With the adaptation measures, 
NATO wants to improve its operational 
readiness and responsiveness. This includes 
creating the planning, logistical, and equip-
ment conditions for larger units to be moved 
more quickly to the theatre of operations 
and enabling them to be more rapidly 
operational once there. This includes the 
strengthening of NATO’s regional presence, 
such as through the creation of small per-
manent regional units (NATO Force Integra-
tion Units, NFIU). They are to facilitate the 
rapid relocation of armed forces into the 
region and assist in the planning and coor-
dination of training and exercises. Besides, 
regional NATO HQs are taking on more 
responsibility, namely the Multinational 
Division Southeast Headquarters in Bucha-
rest and the Multinational Corps Headquar-
ters Northeast (MNC NE) in Stettin. A further 
element is the reform of NATO’s Response 
Force (NRF). An enhanced NRF should be 
more quickly deployable in the future. 
Furthermore, a small, particularly rapid, 
reaction force of around 5,000 troops (land 
components) has been created within the 
NRF to deploy at very short notice – the 
Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF). 
In parallel, all countries of the region 
have responded on the national level to 
the changed threat perception. The main 
examples are: Increasing the defence budg-
ets (such as Poland, the Baltics), intensify-
ing cooperation with NATO (Finland, Swe-
den), deepening bilateral defence relation-
ships (Finland and Sweden; Sweden and 
Denmark), and adopting measures against 
hybrid threats, such as countering propa-
ganda or strengthening infrastructure 
(Finland, the Baltics). 
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A Test Case for Political Unity and 
Military Capacity to Act 
Despite these efforts, the Baltic Sea area 
could turn into a test case for Europe’s 
security settings, mainly because it is the 
most convenient for Russia to test NATO’s 
and the EU’s willingness and capacity to act. 
First, it is a test of political unity, in both 
times of crisis and daily routine. Would the 
states of the region and the other Europeans 
be able to react jointly to Russian aggres-
sion in the north-east? This might be par-
ticularly difficult in the case of hybrid 
threats, where violence is often not directly 
attributable, does not have a clear military 
character, and often remains below the 
threshold at which the EU or NATO could 
clearly react. Although it is likely that Allies 
and EU members will achieve unity when 
faced with an existential crisis, it is more 
difficult to maintain it in everyday deci-
sions. The EU’s maintaining of economic 
sanctions against Russia and NATO keeping 
unity in the run-up to its 2016 summit in 
Warsaw are the current indicators of how 
resilient political unity will be. There will 
certainly be a display of unity at the NATO 
summit, but the decisions to be presented 
will show whether it is based upon a small 
or a large common denominator. Three 
areas matter in particular. First, the stance 
to be taken with regard to Moscow: Will the 
summit focus exclusively on deterrence and 
decide on further measures in the north-
east, or rather on deterrence and dialogue? 
Second, to what extent will NATO develop 
answers to the challenges in the south, 
such as the Islamic State, thereby balancing 
eastern and southern requests? Particularly 
since the 2015 Paris attacks, some Allies, 
such as France, insist that the instability in 
the south is as much an existential threat 
as Russia is in the east. Consequently, opin-
ions diverge about how strongly NATO’s 
military adaptation should be directed east-
wards. Third, the current debate on whether 
and how to adapt NATO’s nuclear strategy 
to bolster deterrence is already dividing 
Allies. Finally, transatlantic ties will once 
again be on trial: Will the European Allies 
get their act together and show solidarity, 
both with eastern and southern Allies, 
without relying solely on the United States 
(US) to take the first steps? 
Second, it is a test of Europe’s military 
capacity to act in the north-east with its 
specific settings (geography, access, member-
ships, capacities) as well as a test of the readi-
ness and responsiveness of its military forces 
and political decision-making processes. In 
the case of an emergency, will NATO be able 
to decide quickly, deploy forces rapidly, and 
reinforce them at an appropriate strength 
and speed? Will the military posture be suf-
ficient? Put differently, will the measures 
taken at the 2014 Wales summit pass the 
reality test? How will non-allied Finland 
and Sweden interpret their ties with NATO 
in cases where the Alliance needs their sup-
port? And will the EU be able to react mili-
tarily if one of its members invokes Art. 42.7? 
Germany: The Silent Baltic State 
Germany is an ambiguous element of 
Nordic–Baltic security. Until recently, its 
policy was rather built on an east–west 
axis, also because the Nordic–Baltic region 
was not a trouble area. But the crisis with 
Russia has brought the region to the fore-
front of security and defence issues. Since 
then, Germany has increased its commit-
ment tremendously, in particular to the 
Baltic states and Poland. Yet, conceptually, 
the long-term goal of the Baltic–Nordic 
focus in Berlin’s security and defence policy 
is still not always clear, despite Germany 
being one of the largest states bordering 
the Baltic Sea and a key player in NATO. 
Moreover, although Germany has re-
sponded with substantial material and po-
litical commitments to NATO, the EU, and 
to multilateral and bilateral formats, it has 
also irritated regional partners with appar-
ently contradictory decisions. Berlin’s sup-
port for the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, which 
circumvents Ukraine and gives Russia a di-
rect energy supply link to Europe, irritated 
the region and has been viewed as being in-
coherent with Berlin’s other policies. 
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So far, Germany’s security and defence 
interest in the region is particularly visible 
in its commitment to NATO and a greater 
level of bilateral support. In terms of bilate-
ral support within NATO measures, Germa-
ny supports the Baltic countries and Poland 
by stationing troops on a rotational basis. 
Together with the US, Berlin launched the 
Transatlantic Capability Enhancement and 
Training Initiative (TACET) to ensure better 
coordination between the US and Germany 
in their training and exercises in eastern 
Europe. Several countries, such as France 
and Italy, have recently joined TACET. 
In addition, in April 2015, Germany 
signed a series of agreements with the Baltic 
states to counter hybrid threats in various 
areas. These include cooperation in the 
areas of energy, culture, education, and 
civil society. A particular focus is on media 
and communications, with the goal of pro-
moting independent and objective media 
to counter Russian propaganda. 
Within NATO, Berlin substantially sup-
ports the RAP measures and the renewed 
focus on collective defence. Its commit-
ments to the region are considerable in 
terms of rotating troops (the largest troop 
provider after the US); providing personnel 
to NFIUs and the MNC NE (which Berlin is 
jointly running with Poland and Denmark); 
participating in exercises; and its general 
standing contribution to NATO forces. 
Yet, this return to collective defence poses 
a challenge to the German armed forces, 
simply because they are no longer used to 
it. Over the last decade, it was crisis manage-
ment – and particularly the operation in 
Afghanistan – that informed their strategic 
thinking and guided decisions on how to 
equip and train the soldiers. In order to en-
sure collective defence again, the Bundes-
wehr had to substantially re-organise its 
planning, equipment, education, and exer-
cises. This poses daunting political, mili-
tary, and financial questions for Berlin. 
Politically, it has to create the preconditions 
for rapid decision-making on any deployment 
and Germany’s share thereof, including, 
where applicable, in multinational struc-
tures such as the VJTF. Militarily, German 
obligations imply a long-term, increased re-
quirement for personnel, equipment, exer-
cises, and planning. Financially, the sub-
stantial contributions needed and related 
changes cannot be borne from current 
funds. The budget increase decided in 2015 
and the announcement in January 2016 
to spend u130bn on equipment until 2030 
are important first steps but not sufficient. 
Defining Germany’s Role 
Germany’s considerable commitment in 
the east could have an even greater impact 
if guided by a concerted Nordic–Baltic ap-
proach. The countries in the region look to 
Germany as a key player and are calling for 
Berlin to get more involved in their regional 
security. Both Germany and the countries 
of the region need to clarify their expecta-
tions and the scope of what they are realis-
tically willing and able to commit. Regional 
security would benefit from more clarity on 
1) Germany’s role, 2) regional contributions 
and interactions, and 3) transatlantic 
relations. 
First, instead of broadly calling for a lar-
ger German role, the countries of the region 
should clarify what they precisely expect 
from Germany, in political and material 
terms. The Baltics and Poland have been 
calling for greater contributions in terms 
of troops and equipment within the NATO 
measures, or on a bilateral basis. Yet, it 
should be further clarified what these coun-
tries would organise among themselves, 
and what with Germany. Do they expect 
Germany to only provide troops, or also to 
help maintain capabilities, joint procure-
ment, and even develop resilience? Would 
Germany serve as a backbone, as it does 
within the RAP, into which the smaller 
countries of the region would plug in? This 
would reduce the sovereignty of those coun-
tries and increase their dependence upon 
Germany, something that not all are com-
fortable with. Although it would send a 
strong message throughout Europe that 
close defence cooperation is possible, it 
SWP Comments 13 
March 2016 
8 
would require a considerable amount of 
political trust. So far, not many countries 
have been willing to engage in such close 
cooperation. A possible step here could 
be the Framework Nation Concept (FNC), 
which Germany suggested as a tool to 
systematically organise defence coopera-
tion, and to which several countries of the 
region have already signed up. According to 
the FNC, a larger country (e.g. Germany) 
would provide the military backbone, i.e. 
logistics, command and control, etc. Into 
this framework, smaller nations would 
plug their specialised capabilities, such 
as air defence. The entire cluster would 
become more effective and sustainable. 
Yet, a greater German commitment 
would not be limited to material support 
but also involve a political dimension – with 
the potential for friction. Many countries 
of the region, such as Poland, do not share 
Germany’s support for an approach based 
on deterrence and détente towards Russia. 
Thus, if Germany were to live up to these 
greater expectations and turn more to the 
north-east, its even greater role in European 
security might create tensions with some 
countries. Besides, such an eastern focus 
might irritate southern Allies, who already 
fear an imbalance in favour of the east. 
Second, clarification is required as to 
what the Baltic and Nordic countries are 
able and willing to deliver themselves in 
terms of security, defence, deterrence, and 
resilience. To what extent would they com-
mit themselves for each other, such as the 
Nordics for Poland? Here, Germany could 
serve as an enabler of regional cooperation. 
Yet, the prerequisite would be better 
regional interaction. 
The non-NATO states Finland and Swe-
den should also seek to clarify their com-
mitments to NATO. Although it is difficult 
to imagine that these states would not 
receive any help from their partners if they 
were to be attacked, both have to under-
stand that NATO Art. 5 is for members only. 
Free-riding on security comes at the price of 
uncertainty, whereas being a NATO ally has 
clear advantages. Yet, by limiting the debate 
to the membership issue, which is unlike-
ly to materialise soon, NATO and Germany 
on the one hand, and Finland and Sweden 
on the other, are missing out on other co-
operation issues. All should explore the 
opportunities for cooperation that are pos-
sible without it: The HNS is a first step. 
Capability cooperation, as started in NATO 
with the FNC, could also be implemented 
in the EU – all sides would benefit from it. 
Besides, the EU states should clarify what 
the implementation of Art 42.7 would mean 
in practical – including military – terms. 
Third, particular attention should be 
paid early on to the role of the US, given its 
considerable commitment, and given that 
most countries see their bilateral ties with 
the US as the ultimate life insurance. The 
Baltic states and Poland greatly value the 
bilateral troop deployments to their terri-
tories as a key element of reassurance and 
deterrence. Others, such as Sweden, are 
seeking to renew bilateral defence agree-
ments. Yet, in order to strengthen regional 
security and move towards a fairer trans-
atlantic burden-sharing, the US and Europe 
should strive to overcome these bilateral-
isms. Though understandable, it is not a 
long-term solution. The US should use its 
leverage to force Europeans into long-term 
intra-European cooperation. One possibility 
is the establishment of a cooperation clus-
ter (following the FNC model), in which the 
US cooperates with small and large Euro-
pean allies, thereby forcing them into sus-
tainable cooperation. Once this cooperation 
is established, the US could withdraw, leav-
ing the Europeans to maintain it. A poten-
tial area is heavy air lift. 
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